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State Capitalism: The rise of sovereign wealth funds
13t November 2007
By Gerard Lyons
(Gerard Lyons is Chief economist and group Head of Global Research at Standard Chartered and is also
Economic Advisor to the Board).
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have existed since 1953 and are here to stay. Their size and
influence is set to grow. Already valued around $2.2 trillion, on current trends they could even
reach $13.4 trillion in a decade. Here I provide a comprehensive and up to date analysis of
SWFs, detailing the largest 22, what drives them and their likely future impact.
1. The Super Seven: There are already seven big SWFs that have over $100 billion in assets.
These are the funds that dominate and include Abu Dhabi, GIC of Singapore, Norway,
Kuwait, China, Russia and Temasek.
2. The Secret Funds: Whilst one way of looking at these funds is their size, another is to
analyse their investment approach and philosophy. A number of funds are not so
transparent and include the UAE funds, China, Qatar, Brunei, Venezuela, Taiwan, Oman
and Kuwait.
3. Three Crucial Implications:
(a) The influence of SWFs on financial markets is set to grow. Expect these government
controlled funds to: take bigger financial stakes in equity and bond markets across emerging
economies; to feed more money into alternative investments such as hedge funds and
private equity; to boost strategic links with countries that have not shared fully in globalisation
or which have been shunned by the West; and to take more strategic stakes in sensitive
areas within developed countries. It is these last two areas, which I call State Capitalism, that
is the most problematic aspect of sovereign wealth funds.
(b) There is a serious likelihood of Western governments and SWFs clashing over what they can
buy and where. A protectionist backlash against strategic investments would be damaging for
global trade. There is a huge difference between what is needed and what is likely to happen.
There is a strong case for SWFs to adopt the best practice of open funds like Norway. But
many governments will argue that it is their money and why should they be so transparent
when other areas of financial markets are not. In addition, there is a strong case to be made
to encourage the opening up of markets from which SWFs emanate (the so-called level
playing field). But this will take time and we are more likely to see Western governments
seeking to protect national champions and strategic sectors, as is their right. The aim should
be to improve governance and transparency and promote an investment framework that is
fair and commercially driven.
(c) The rise of SWFs should be seen as a further sign of a shift in the world economy and
Western countries should seize this as an opportunity to work with emerging economies such
as China and Russia and others to find common ground rules and a code of practice.
Although multilateral groups like the IMF and World Bank or even the World Trade
Organisation may be best placed to decide a code of practice the danger is that they will be
ineffective. In fact more SWFs may invest strategically in order to position their economies on
the world stage! Yet, as long as investments by SWFs are made for commercial reasons,
and not for political purposes, then these funds should be accepted.
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1. The impact and implications
1a. Introduction
This Report focuses on a major global issue - the rise of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). We
have been at the forefront of this debate, although we have talked about it in terms of State
Capitalism - as it is this, rather than all aspects of SWFs, that is the crux of the issue. State
Capitalism is the use of government controlled funds to acquire strategic stakes around the world.
The growth of SWFs and the location of the countries from which they originate provides another
example of how the balance of economic and financial power is shifting.
SWFs are not new. In fact some of them have a long history, with the first being established as
long ago as 1953. Of the twenty two largest SWFs that are examined in this report, seven were in
existence before 1990, six started in the 90s and nine since the millennium. A number of smaller
funds have started in recent years and, as existing funds prove successful, this may well
encourage other countries to establish their own. Given how long SWFs have been in existence,
it is remarkable how focus on them has only recently become a big issue, particularly in policy
circles. Why is this?
The change seems to be occurring on both sides. On the SWF side, the difference is that now the
number of countries pursuing such a strategy of having their own fund has soared and the
amounts at their disposal are huge. Although many SWFs are keen to ensure high investment
returns, there is now added concern about where and what they could buy. China's fund is just
the latest example.
Meanwhile, in terms of countries into which this money is flowing, there now seems to be far
more awareness of the existence of SWFs. In particular, three broad issues stand out as bringing
this to wider attention. One, is the potential for these funds to make more strategic investments -
hence the term State Capitalism. Second, is the surge in size of these funds and the likelihood
that they will continue to grow. Third, is the increased concern about the lack of transparency of
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some of these funds. All this has focused attention on the fact that, as the consequences of State
Capitalism are not clear, there are no ground rules regarding how SWFs should behave and thus
no rules as to what they can buy. This, in turn, has added to concerns about future protectionism.
In many respects, SWFs are their own worst enemy. Their air of secrecy, including for some a
lack of transparency has, in recent years, led to some concern. Although the funds may argue
that there are others within the financial markets that are equally secretive, it is the suspicion
about their intentions that makes this a more problematic area. This need not be the case. Some
SWFs are very open - Norway is perhaps the best example of a fully transparent fund.
There are many challenges with SWFs: a major one being their opaqueness, an additional
challenge being how one defines a SWF. Allowing for certain exceptions, their main
characteristics are: ownership by a sovereign nation state rather than a regional or local state
entity; not national pension funds and not central banks or authorities that perform roles typical of
a central bank. This is a credible set of qualifying assumptions. It does, however, exclude the
likes of Saudi Arabia's Monetary Authority (SAMA), which has reserves of $251 billion, and which
also acts as a conduit for the investment of Saudi government funds totalling $116 billion.
The biggest is the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), but as it not a transparent fund, the
estimate of $625 billion may not be spot on. The uncertainty about some funds is highlighted by
some of the wide guesstimates that exist. Take Kuwait as an example. The figure of $213 billion
cited in this Report is based on a reply to a Parliamentary question and seems to be more reliable
than most other estimates, which vary widely. If any of these figures are not spot on it is a
reflection of the secrecy of the SWFs themselves Overall, it is calculated that the estimated size
of the top 22 SWFs is $2.2 trillion. If you add in recent smaller funds, such as Azerbaijan, Trinidad
& Tobago, Ecuador, Nigeria and others, $2.3 trillion is the likely scale.
lb. Scale- the Super Seven
This Report shows that within the major SWFs there is a Super Seven. These are the seven
funds already with over $100 billion in assets. The Super Seven are:
- Abu Dhabi,




- Singapore - Temasek,
- and Russia.
In fact, three of these are also among the five largest if one uses a different benchmark, such as





and Singapore - GIC.
1c. Rapid growth rates and future size
Given the scale of these funds now, an important issue is their likely future size. There are a
number of driving forces behind these funds,
(i) The movement in oil and other commodity prices: petrodollars and revenues generated by
the recent boom in commodity prices have been particularly important for the growth in
SWFs. Sixteen of the largest twenty two funds have commodities as their main source of
income.
(ii) The growth in foreign exchange (FX) reserves. The importance of reserves as a key driver
behind SWFs should not be overlooked. Total global FX reserves are $5.75 trillion, with
Asia accounting for $3.66 trillion. Reserves are rising sharply. For instance, a decade ago,
Asian central banks accounted for one-third of global currency reserves, now they account
for two-thirds.
(iii) The investment performance and returns achieved by the fund, which will clearly be
influenced by many factors, including the macroeconomic and financial climate and the
fund's own strategy. There are, in essence, two parts to SWFs: one, is a fund management,
asset allocation investment; the second is a strategic investment.
(iv) Discretionary factors. Among the six of the largest twenty two that do not rely on commodity
prices, the financing varies. Some, like China, may rely on transfers from FX reserves.
Others, like Malaysia's Khazanah Nasional (number twelve in size) may be partly financed
by debt. A key factor will be how governments wish to finance these funds and the amount
that they wish to funnel to them.
Chart I
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Some of these funds have recently enjoyed rapid growth. Growth rates were estimated last year
for twelve funds, ranging from zero to 100%. Given such a wide spread, it is clear that it is hard to
say anything definite about potential growth rates. Taking out the extremes, and looking at this in
relation to other data, a good guide to average annual performance is just under 20%.
If this growth rate was repeated over the next decade the funds would reach $13.4 trillion. But, of
course, the last few years have been spectacular for the world economy and for financial
markets. Whilst that may suggest caution about the future growth rate, many of the funds may
continue to be fed by growing FX reserves. Even if we just assumed that there were no additions
to these funds and that they experienced only a modest return over the next ten years, matching
an average of the annualised retums seen on US and emerging equities over the last decade
then the size of these funds would grow to $5.2 trillion, in itself a large number. Furthermore, the
aims of SWFs vary and whilst some may seek to maximise returns, the strategic element
sometimes works against that principle. This makes it hard to gauge their likely future size,
although it will be fair to assume they will be large and their influence will grow.
There is every likelihood that the SWFs that countries in the West are most concerned about will
continue to grow significantly. Take China, for instance. China's new SWF, the China Investment
Corporation (CIC), will have an initial capital of around $200 billion and will absorb an earlier fund,
established in 2003, the Huijin Investment Company. There is no ideal level of FX reserves,
despite many academic studies attempting to determine some magical formula. Yet China's
behaviour appears to suggest that they believe FX reserves have reached a significant level to
allow China to cope with any external shock. That level would appear to be around $1.1 trillion.
Reserves have continued to rise, to around $1.4 trillion, coinciding with the establishment of its
$200 billion fund. The amount allocated to this fund looks set to grow. With China committed to a
gradualist appreciation of the CNY, its currency reserves look set to keep rising, reaching $2
trillion in early 2009. As reserves grow, it would be no surprise if additional amounts were used in
stages to swell the size of China's SWF to, say, $600 billion within two years! Recent
developments within China have put a lot of emphasis on this new fund being performance
dependent, particularly as behind the scenes not everyone appears happy with its remit. This, in
turn, could encourage The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) to become more
aggressive in its managing of remaining FX reserves, to lessen the argument for more funds
going into the new SWF. Furthermore, the new CIC fund, will also use some of its funds to help
restructure the financial sector.
Over time, in general and not necessarily in every country, it seems likely that SWFs will grow at
a faster pace than the rise in FX reserves. The funds will not only be fed by the growth in
reserves but are likely to enjoy gains on their investment, swelling their size further. Of course,
currency policy itself has a big bearing. The appreciating currencies are, by and large, likely to be
those enjoying current account surpluses. The lesson of Asia over the last decade is testimony to
how this could continue to play out over the next ten years. As intervention takes place to stem
the pace of appreciation, this not only leads to currency reserves rising further, but keeps the
currency competitive, underpinning its current account. But at some stage, possibly even in
coming years and certainly over the next decade, Asia itself will move from being export driven to
relying much more on domestic demand. In which case, current account surpluses will shrink and
the growth in currency reserves may slow. Although this in itself may remove one of the drivers of
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the rise in SWFs it will be replaced by another driver - namely the growth in Asian domestic
demand will go hand in hand with the deepening of Asian financial markets. And, if SWFs invest
in these markets at an early stage (as they already appear to be) then they are likely to enjoy
rapid investment returns, as the capitalisation of these asset markets grow.
The size of SWFs may also grow relative to other types of investment. According to figures
quoted from McKinsey, the world has $167 trillion of financial assets. Thus SWFs constitute 1.3%
of this total. But this is likely to rise, particularly as the four constituent parts (i) to (iv) outlined
above look set to grow. The current $2.2 trillion in SWFs compares with figures of $1-1.5 trillion
for hedge funds and between $0.7 trillion to $1.1 trillion for private equity. Yet the growth in SWFs
itself is likely to feed both of these areas, as the investment allocation of SWFs may see more
funds directed into alternative investments such as hedge funds and private equity. The growth
of SWFs, alongside that of hedge funds, private equity, government pension funds and of
currency reserves is a clear indication of the shift underway in parts of the financial markets.
The IMF's Global Financial Stability Report from this spring also highlighted the shift underway in
markets, although in their analysis the IMF groups the rise in FX reserves and in SWFs together,
"Tentative estimates of foreign assets held by sovereigns include $5.6 trillion of international
reserves and between $1.9 trillion and $2.9 trillion in types of sovereign wealth fund (SWF)
arrangements. These amount to about 10 times less than the assets under management of
mature market institutional investors ($53 trillion) and modestly higher than those managed by
hedge funds ($1 trillion to $1.5 trillion) (Financial Stability Forum, 2007). Current IMF projections
are that sovereigns (predominantly emerging markets) will continue to accumulate international
assets at the rate of $800 billion to $900 billion per year, which could bring the aggregate foreign
assets under sovereign management to about $12 trillion by 2012." But, as we mention above,
not only are SWFs likely to grow at a faster pace than the increase in FX reserves, but they could
exceed such FX reserves in total size in a number of years.
Not only are FX reserves different to SWFs, but so too are sovereign pension funds. Again these
funds are sizeable, whether they are in Chile, Ireland or Saudi Arabia. Collectively, one could
I1
argue that all of these (SWFs, FX reserves and sovereign pension funds) are a sign of the
increasing might of emerging economies and they reflect another sign of the changing balance of
power in the world economy.
Id. Secrecy and accountability
But it is not the age or the size of these funds that has recently prompted attention; it is the
opaqueness or secrecy of the fund, and in particular concern about the strategic intention of







These funds provide detailed information on their size, returns achieved and their portfolio
composition. And many companies have seen these as investors without any apparent issues to
date.









A simple way to picture this is two axes: on the horizontal axis one measures a fund's
transparency, from low (or opaque) on the left to high on the right. Meanwhile, on the vertical
axis, funds can be measured on how their investment decisions are made, namely conventional
(say, asset allocation) to strategic. On this basis, one could construct four boxes:
Bottom left being low transparency but conventional investment strategy;
Bottom right high transparency and conventional strategy;
Top right being high transparency and strategic;
Top left being low transparency and strategic.
Chart 2 would imply that the SWFs in the bottom right pose little concern, as they are not
strategic and are transparent. The other three boxes all prompt questions, with the biggest area
of concern relating to the top left segment. The four SWFs here being both strategic in their
investment and also having relatively low transparency. Once again this graph demonstrates the
difficulty of generalising about such funds, as a number have very different characteristics. The
most secretive funds are on the extreme left of the chart. Whilst secrecy in itself does not mean
that a fund will be a bad investor, in a global financial environment where transparency and
accountability are seen as important positives, such opaqueness should not be encouraged.
One of the surprising aspects of this chart is the position of Russia - seen as relatively
transparent and also less strategic than other funds. Allthough both of these characteristics may
change when, as of next year, the Russian fund begins to invest partially in more risky assets (so
far it does not invest in global equities), this nonetheless might genuinely raise questions as to
why there appears to be such apprehension about their intentions. That the situation is likely to
change is perhaps the concern amongst some countries. But if there is change it can be two-
way. For instance, in my view the increased US dialogue with China, particularly in areas such
as the Strategic Economic Dialogue, plus China's desire to ensure high returns form their fund
may account for their decision to allocate some of their new money to be managed by
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international investment managers. That, of course, leads on to what is best practice for SWFs?
The bottom right of this chart highlights a number of funds that may be seen as adopting best
practice.
le. Implications - strategic behaviour
What then are the implications of SWFs? One can look at this in many different ways, in terms of
their impact on economies and markets around the world, how the funds themselves might
evolve, the likelihood that they will feed protectionist sentiment in the West, and indeed whether
governments and funds can work together to ensure some common ground rules.
Chart 2: The Top 22 Sovereign Wealth Funds
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Strategic stakes are bought: Making investments for purely commercial reasons are one thing,
but when they involve govemment owned funds and the stake is potentially strategic it is clearly
another thing. The big worry is that these funds see an opportunity to acquire strategic stakes in




- The financial sector,
- Or even to secure intellectual property rights in other fields.
The difficulty is that many of the more strategic funds are not so transparent and thus it is hard to
measure such stakes. Nonetheless, the economic rationale behind such strategic acquisitions is
clear. Some countries may seen this as a way to move up the value curve quickly, as they
acquire intellectual property and access to research, design and development that it may take
years to develop at home. For instance, the expertise of emerging economies, such as China, in
low cost manufacturing could quickly be added to by the acquisition of high tech firms overseas.
Of course that raises questions, such as should China be able to secure intellectual property
rights overseas, at a time when it cannot guarantee to safeguard such rights for foreign firms in
their market? Buying into overseas financial firms (whether through SWFs or other arms of a
government) makes long-term strategic sense for many emerging economies, particularly if it
allows them to transfer such financial skills back home to help develop and deepen domestic
financial markets.
Resource nationalism: This means an attempt to buy access to strategic commodities and
resources around the world. This is linked into the fundamental shift in the demand for
commodities. China stands out here given its insatiable appetite for all types of commodities, and
not just energy. For instance between 2004 and 2006, China moved from accounting for 21% to
26% of total global demand for six industrial commodities (by last year accounting for 30% of zinc
demand, 32% tin, 19% nickel, 27% lead, 23% copper and 26% of global demand for aluminium).
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In softer commodities it also accounts for a significant proportion of demand (16% wheat, 19%
maize, 21% soybean and 31% rice). There is also the buying of overseas strategic assets linked
to energy. And here attention is sometimes focused on what happens in the home country from
which a SWF originates as much as on what happens abroad. For instance, Russia, and other oil
producers, are also in a powerful position as national oil companies become bigger and in the
process edge out western multinationals from their oil reserves. And a wider concern linked in
here is how will the owners of these stakes behave in the future.
The role of SWFs in enhancing a country's strategic agenda should not be overlobked, although
in reality there are many ways that a country can seek to provide funds to another country.
China's strategic ambitions should not be doubted, as its relationship with Africa highlights. This
relationship has changed over the years. After initial enthusiasm a few years ago about Chinese
investment in Africa there was then a backlash, as concerns were raised in Africa about both
China's intentions and about whether its investment was in the Continent's best interests. Given
China's strong incentive to purchase access now to future supplies, the Chinese responded by
courting African policy makers. Nearly 50 African leaders were hosted in Beijing last autumn,
whilst the annual African Development Bank took place this May in Shanghai, during which the
Chinese announced the availability of further funds to be invested in African projects. This could
yet evolve further. How will the market and trading companies cope with direct government to
government deals on commodity flows, or even with buying of the mining companies themselves?
1f. Implications - protectionist stance
Protectionist backlash: There is a need to take seriously the likelihood of Western governments
and SWFs being on a future collision course over what they can buy, and where. A protectionist
backlash against strategic investments is very real and threatens global trade. As we have seen
from recent years, not all countries that are on the receiving end of these flows like this idea. The
Thai authorities did not like Temasek of Singapore's purchase of a telecommunications stake in
their country, whilst Dubai Ports World had to abandon their attempt to buy P&O's US ports after
it prompted a national securlty debate in the US Congress. China's CNOOC bid for Unocal was
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also blocked in the US. Future political reactions could be far worse. It is not only governments
that should be concerned; markets need to take note of the consequences.
The desire of some governments to protect their strategic assets from the clutches of SWFs is
coinciding with a rising anti-globalisation sentiment in some countries. If governments attempted
to protect strategic industries or important companies, this poses the question of how one defines
a strategic industry? One linked to defence is understandable - hence in the UK the government
has a golden share in British Aerospace that allows it to veto foreign control. But in other areas it
is more difficult to say. Yet it is possible to conceive of a number of areas where there are
legitimate reasons for a cautious or even protectionist stance on behalf of the recipient country.
Such examples might be if the outcome would damage domestic competition; if the outcome was
detrimental to national security - which is already a key issue in the US whether or not it is a SWF
or any other investor that wishes to buy; and perhaps such a response is legitimate if a SWF is
secretive and its intentions are strategic.
Before we get to this situation there is a need for ground rules to be established on SWFs. These
could be imposed at the country or regional levels, but that is a second-best outcome. Far better
for a credible global body to seek to establish some ground rules, providing the views of emerging
countries were fully reflected. Of course, this risks an ineffective outcome.
Many factors have contributed to the recent economic boom, including the opening up of world
trade and global financial flows. But the transition to a more global economy can be painful -
whilst there are winners (especially in the emerging world), there are also losers (including low
skilled workers in developed countries who may not receive large wage gains). It is in response to
this that protectionist sentiment may gain a strong footing and the rest of the world is observing
this situation in the US.
Yet the European stance is equally important - especially as European-Asian trade has now
overtaken US-Asian trade.
In recent EU bilateral trade negotiations, they UK's desire to insert social or sustainability clauses
in order to protect not just areas of national security but also areas of national sensitivity led to
much confusion and highlighted how complex this area is and in my mind provided another
example of the need for widely agreed ground rules in such trade negotiations.
In some respects it picks up the present mood in Western Europe, which appears to be leaning
towards more protection. According to the Centre for European Reform, "Several EU
Governments have become alarmed about SWFs. Germany, for example, is thinking of
preventing such funds from buying local companies in sensitive sectors. The European
Commission is considering how it should respond: should it outlaw such defences or establish
them at EU level? ...... the EU needs to ensure that any measures taken in response to SWFs do
not threaten the openness of its single market."
1g. Implications - market impact
Money goes elsewhere: For instance, if the US Congress becomes more protectionist, blocking
state inflows from, say, China, would the money just go elsewhere? Indeed this already appears
to be happening in terms of flows from the Middle East that in the past predominantly went to the
US. Whilst the US is still the main recipient, a report earlier this year from the Institute of
International Finance, using estimates from the United Nations, suggests that there has been a
shift away from the US, and that between 2002-2006 20% of investment from Gulf States went to
Europe, 11% to the Middle East/North African and 11% to Asia.
It is likely that SWFs could divert their attention from markets in the West to focus on nascent
equity and bond markets in emerging economies. In fact such a strategy makes sense anyway,
as whether one is cautious or optimistic about the global economy, emerging economies are
likely to see stronger rates of growth than OECD countries, and offer better longer-term
investment opportunities.
Financial markets: Government intervention through state funds could cause distortions
particularly if the funds become active in regional markets across parts of Asia, Africa and Latin
America that are smaller, less liquid and lacking maturity. There the impact of foreign state funds
could be huge. In recent times there have sometimes been concerns in financial markets of what
could happen to US Treasury yields if Asian central banks sold, but in this context for emerging
markets the impact of SWFs is likely to be seen in a positive light - provided the markets are big
enough and have the capacity to absorb such inflows.
Pro-cyclical market impact: The impact of larger SWFs on markets could be pro-cyclical,
reinforcing trends that are coming into place. Indeed it is possible to see the impact of FX
diversification away from the dollar and of SWF investment in smaller and faster growing
emerging markets as resulting in a strong impact, adding to dollar weakness and emerging
market equity strength. Furthermore, as the funds become bigger they could shift to more risk-
seeking behaviour, feeding alternative investments such as hedge funds and private equity, as
mentioned above, as well as enhancing the attraction of emerging markets. There is a risk that
the presence of SWFs in riskier asset markets could lead to a moral hazard problem, especially if
the SWFs have strategic and not just profit maximising objectives. The attraction of emerging
markets could go hand in hand with a further shift in global FX reserves away from the dollar.
Although the bulk of global reserves are in dollars, its share is declining, albeit slowly. It is not in
Asian countries' interests to actively sell the dollar now, but we believe that passive diversification
is already underway, as Asian central banks put less of new reserves into dollars. Of course, if
they were to actively sell the dollar then the impact - both direct and more particularly indirect -
would be significant. For instance, if Asian central banks were to switch reserves to match
countries with whom they trade, they would need to offload $1.39 trillion, or a quarter of the
world's total reserves.
Greater equity purchases in mature markets: Yet even in the mature established markets there
could be consequences. The desire to increase retums could see greater equity purchases by
state funds, raising the question of how they will behave if they are equity holders when hostile
takeovers take place? Would one really want a fund run by the Russian authorities, say, deciding
on the fate of a hostile banking takeover?
I h. Implications - need for ground rules
Level playing fields: This is often referred to in terms of reciprocity. Whilst the fear is a
protectionist response the West should use the growth of state capitalism to force change for
good. For instance, in the UK's financial sector, the aim will be to continue to embrace the
Wimbledon effect - better to have the best financial market in London, even if most of the key
players are foreign owned. But at Wimbledon the playing field is flat. Chinese banks may buy,
own and exert full control over British banks, but could the reverse happen? If the West accepts
that Chinese firms can buy freely overseas using state reserves then this should lead to pressure
for China to open its domestic markets further. And the same pressure should be applied to other
countries with large state funds that invest overseas.
Best practice: SWFs need to adopt the best practice of the open funds such as Norway.
Appropriate regulation of all aspects of the financial sector is needed, and sovereign funds should
not be immune, particularly as their importance grows. Whether it is possible to have a code of
conduct for SWFs remains to be seen, the likelihood being that many countries will view it as their
money, and they may not view it as relevant what Norway, or indeed other countries do. This is in
all likelihood what would happen.
Avoiding collision: There are some crucial steps that need to be taken to prevent a collision
between SWFs and host nations into which they invest. Yet the preconditions for such a collision
seem to be already falling into place:
- SWFs are growing significantly and the need for resources, as well as a desire to acquire
expertise is resulting in a significant strategic element in many SWFs.
- This growth mirrors structural shifts in the world economy, where emerging markets are
outperforming and assets in these markets look set to exhibit steady and even rapid growth
(albeit allowing for near-term cyclical challenges as the pace of global growth slows in the
next two years).
- The challenges of globalisation, plus below trend growth in the US in 2008 and 2009, feed a
protectionist stance in the US and in some Western European countries.
How this might play out is hard to say, but it is unlikely to be pleasant.
Non-voting stakes: In trying to establish workable ground rules for SWFs, one issue is that of
non-voting shares. If SWFs behave as institutional investors that own minority stakes then there
may be few grounds for objection, or cause for concern. But if the SWFs begin to acquire large
stakes this may lead to valid questions being asked. In particular, one concern is that direct
influence by government controlled stakes may lead to capital misallocation and inefficiency.
Another is that fear of political interference in business decisions and strategies. One possible
solution is to limit SWFs to non-voting shares, although the challenge here is the ability to
discriminate between different types of investors.
As there is a strong case for more openness and best practice in terms of governance. The
growth of newer SWFs has prompted much discussion about whether they will be able to attract
the talent to manage such funds. But, in reality, this is no different to others in the rapidly growing
financial sector across emerging markets. It may, of course, encourage such funds as they grow
to allocate money to third party fund managers. Although that may ease concerns about their
transparency it does not remove the need for more openness.
Code of conduct: Western countries may need to accept the rise of SWFs as a further sign of a
shift in the world economy and should seize this as an opportunity to work with economies such
as China, Russia, countries in the Middle East and others to find common ground rules and a
code of practice. Although multilateral groups like the IMF and World Bank or even the World
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Trade Organisation may be best placed to decide a code of practice the danger is that they will
be ineffective.
State capitalism and resource nationalism are already a major economic phenomenon. Across
Asia, Russia and the Middle East governments look set to use their country's currency reserves
and savings to acquire overseas assets. Whether it is China, Korea, Qatar or Abu Dhabi or a host
of others their funds appear intent on improving returns, building up long-term assets and
acquiring strategic stakes around the globe. The shopping list is long!
Force for good: The mood towards SWFs in many emerging countries appears to be to view
them as a potential force for good. I have either heard such views directly, or heard them relayed
to me from colleagues. In some respects this is a reflection of the SWFs being seen as a further
shift in the balance of economic and financial power, and also reflecting the increasing confidence
seen in regions such as Asia and the Middle East. Furthermore, there is the expectation that
such SWFs will be a source of liquidity and of investment flows into emerging markets.
Section 2: The largest sovereign wealth funds
2a. Selection Criteria
The following analysis has been carried out with the support of Oxford Analytica.
One of the many challenges with SWFs is how one defines them. In this analysis the SWFs that
we have included fulfil the following criteria:
- Owned by a sovereign nation state, rather than a regional or local state entity. As exceptions
to this rule, we have included five subnational-level funds that are financed by foreign
exchange assets resulting from commodities exports, and that are large enough to rank
within our top 22: ADIA (Abu Dhabi), Istithmar (Dubai), Dubai International Capital, Alberta
Heritage Savings Trust Fund (Canada) and Alaska's Permanent Reserve Fund.
- Not national pension funds, unless these are financed directly by foreign exchange assets
generated by commodity exports. This excludes, for example, Australia's Future Fund,
Thailand's Government Pension Fund and Chile's Pension Guarantee Fund, while permitting
the inclusion of Norway's Government Pension Fund - Global.
- Not central banks or authorities that perform roles typical of a central bank (eg supervision or
currency issuance), even if these organisations also manage foreign exchange assets. This
excludes organisations such as the Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority (SAMA), which has
foreign reserves of 251 billion US dollars. In addition, SAMA acts as a conduit for the foreign
investments of Saudi government funds, including the General Organization for Social
Insurance and the Retirement Pensions Agency, which together have total assets of 116
billion US dollars. However, SAMA is the country's central bank, performing roles such as
currency issuance, so we have not included it.
- Investment funds rather than producers of goods or services (although they may invest in
productive companies). This excludes state-owned energy companies and state development
banks.
2b. Methodology
The methodology for gathering data has centred on a search of publicly available data,
particularly:
- SWF websites, if these exist.
- Media reports on the activities of SWFs.
- Research reports by other financial institutions on SWFs.
For several of the least transparent SWFs, information was also requested by e-mail.
The Appendix to this report provides data on some additional funds, which we analysed, but
which did not make the top 22 by being excluded using the above criteria (funds i-iii in the
appendix) or on grounds of size (funds iv-ix). Many other significant global funds do not meet the
above criteria, so the appendix is not an exhaustive list. In addition, many other small funds are
currently being launched or have existed for some time, for instance in Ecuador or Nigeria, but
either their small size and/or a lack of clarity about their functions means that we did not gather
sufficient data to warrant their inclusion in the appendix.
2c. Summary of Findings
The 22 SWFs identified by the study manage assets worth an estimated total of over two trillion
dollars. The following analysis highlights the differences between the funds in seven main areas:
age, source of funds, scale, aim, governance, investment activity, and growth rate.
Table 1: Estimated size of largest Sovereign Wealth Funds (Billion US Dollars)
ILaunch, US$ % of 20061
fCountry Fund Name year billion(1) GDP
UAE (Abu ADIA 1976 625.0 520.7%
Dhabi)
'Norway Government Pension Fund -Global 1990 [ 322.0 1021.6%
Singapore GIC 1981 215.0 169.0%
Kuait 1 1
China China Investment Corporation 2007 200.0 8.0%
Russia 'Stabilization Fund 20 12.5 14.2%
Singapore Temasek 1974 108.0 84.9%
!Qatar 'Qatar investment Authority - 005- 60- i853%
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund 2000 44.4 49%
JUS (Alaska) Permanent Reserve Fund 1976 402 .3
Libya Libyan Investment Authority 2007 40 117%
lBrunei 'brune Investment-Authority 1983 30.0 i 309.4%
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional BHD 1993 26.1 12.3%
iKorea KIC (Korea Investment Corporation) 2005 20.0 2.2%
Venezuela National Development Fund (Fonden) 2005 17.5 10.5%
iCanada Alberta Heritages-vings Trust Fund 1976 163 1.3 -%
I(Alberta)
Taiwan National Stabilization Fund 2001 15.2 4.0%
iKazakhstan NationaiFund 2000 1[ 14.9 15.6%
Chile Economic and Social Stabilization 2007 11.2 8.7%
Fund
,UAE (Dubai) lstithmar 2003 8.0 6.7%
UAE (Dubai) DIC 2004 6.0 4.0%
Oman 'State General RF " 1980 F6. 16.0%
Total 2,158
2d. Age
Sovereign wealth funds are far from being a new phenomenon. A number of oil exporters were
among the earliest. This includes not only Gulf State funds such as the Kuwait Investment
Authority (established in 1953) but also funds in the United States (Alaskan Permanent Reserve
Fund, established 1976) and Canada (Alberta Heritage Savings Trust, 1976).
Table 2: Launch Year
Lny
2000-2007 China, Russia, Qatar, South Korea, Kazakhstan, Chile,
UAE (Dubai) - Istithmar, UAE (Dubai) - DIC, Taiwan, Libya,
Algeria
Pre-1990 UAE (Abu Dhabi) - ADIA, Singapore (GIC and Temasek),
Kuwait, United States (Alaska), Brunei, Canada, Oman
2e. Source of funds
The large majority of SWFs are financed by the export of commodities. Most non-commodity
funds are recent, including China (2007), South Korea (2005) and Taiwan (2001). The two
Singaporean funds (launched 1974 and 1981) are the only well-established, large non-commodity
SWFs.
Table 3: Source of funds
Source ofiunds Top 22 SWFs
Commodities UAE (Abu Dhabi) - ADIA, Kuwait, US (Alaska), Brunei,
Canada, Chile, Oman, Norway, Venezuela, Russia,
Kazakhstan, UAE (Dubai) - lsithmar, UAE (Dubai) - DIC,
Libya, Algeria
Non-commodties] Singapore (GIC and Tmasek). China, Taiwan, South
Korea, Malaysia
2f. Scale
In section lb I talked of the SWFs in terms of the Super Seven. Once can also try and gauge
their scale in other ways. The two charts below illustrate the scale of SWFs, respectively,
compared to the size of major stock exchanges, and compared to the sizes of leading asset
managers and pension funds. These comparisons make it clear that SWFs have, and will
continue to have, an extremely significant impact on global financial markets.
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2g. Aim
Although the strategic investment component of the SWFs is now a concern, the tables below on
the funds show that they were typically established with a primary focus on one or more of the
following aims:
(i) Macroeconomic stabilisation. Countries that are highly dependent on commodity exports
are exposed to swings in global prices. The primary aim of the fund in these cases can be
to smooth short- and medium-term fluctuations.
(ii) Higher returns. Countries that have surplus funds are increasingly seeking to maximise
returns. This is motivated by the opportunity cost associated with funds being invested in
risk free assets.
(iii) Future generations. Several funds were created with the objective to create a reserve of
wealth for the future, when natural resources will have been depleted.
(iv) Domestic industries. Some of the funds have also been used to restructure and encourage
domestic industries.
2h. Governance
Management responsibility for SWFs varies widely, from Ministries of Finance and central banks
through to separate entities that often have executive boards to make decisions. External money
managers are typically contracted to manage funds on the basis of policies set by the board.
A limited number of funds, including the Norwegian fund, provide detailed information on their
operations and performance. Among newer funds, there is a divergence between those that
have sought to adopt best practice, and those where arrangements seem to have emerged on an
almost ad hoc basis and where little is known of formal codes. Most obviously in the latter
category is the new Chinese fund, and this is partly why China's SWF investments are raising
most concern in recipient markets.
2i. Investment activity
The flurry of SWF activity in established stock markets this year has been striking. Investment
policies vary, but tend to do so according to the SWF's primary aim and governance.
'Future generations' funds with high levels of transparency, such as the SWFs in Norway,
Alberta and Alaska, have a high level of diversification and hold only small stakes.
Norway's fund owns shares in about 3,500 companies, and it holds stakes that are typically
below 1%.
Stabilisation funds such as Russia's, for example, are tasked with delivering stable and low-
risk returns, and so are limited to investment in AAA-rated sovereign bonds, with a given
currency composition to manage currency risk.
Low-transparency funds such as the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) usually prefer
investing in small stakes to avoid disclosure requirements.
A number of funds have acquired significant stakes in foreign companies. These include
the China Investment Corporation, GIC, Temasek, the Kuwait Investment Authority, the
Qatar Investment Authority, and Dubai's Istithmar and DIC.
2j. Growth rates
Growth rates could be estimated for only twelve funds (see chart 5). For several funds direct
information on growth rates in 2006 is not available, and the estimates are based on secondary
sources or proxies for growth, such as returns over longer periods of time or estimates of returns
or transfers to the fund.
Chart 5. Estimated growth rates of a selection of SWFs
Source: Oxford Analytica
Top 22 Sovereign Wealth Funds
1. Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (UAE)
ILaunch Year ]1976
Fund Value (US dollars) Estimates vary significantly - from 250 billion to 1 trillion.1
Our analysis says 625 billion.
Fund Value as % ofGDP J 521%










Diversify investment of foreign currency reserves from oil exports.
100% owned by Government of Abu Dhabi.
Sheikh Khalifa, president of the UAE, is the Chairman.
d No investments in commodities and Middle East stock markets.
Stakes in financial institutions in the region include Banque de
Tunisie et des Emirats (39%), Arab Banking Corporation in
1 Bahrain (27%), Arab International Bank in Egypt (25%), and theI
Joint Arab Investment Corporation (23%). Until 2006, investments
J! only in foreign assets. ADIA's asset allocation: 50-60% in equities,
20-25% in fixed income, 5-8% in real estate, 5-10% in private 1
equity and 5-10% in altemaUves. Usually investments are limited
to less than 4.5% to avoid disclosure. In 2006, a new institution
1 was set up, the Abu Dhabi Investment Council, with the goal of
investing both within and outside Abu Dhabi.
The United Arab Emirates are expected to run annual current
account surpluses of 35-40 billion US dollars over the medium
term if oil prices remain at about the current level. ADIA could
potentially be allocated a large part of these funds.
i Transparency is very low. In the 30 years since it was
established, it has never publicly declared the value of assets it 1
has under management. There is a lack of clarity about how much
ILcooperation and competition there is between ADIA and ADIC.
3
In May 2007 ADIA acquired 8% of EFG-Hermes, an Egyptian
investment bank. In July 2007 purchased a small stake in Apollo
Management, a US private equity company. In September 2007
ADIA announced a takeover of PrimeWest Energy Trust (Canada)
for 5 billion dollars, according to press reports.
1 250 billion (2005, State Street); 250-500 billion (2007, Financial Times); 600-1,000 billion (2007, Financial
News); 875 billion (2007, Morgan Stanley).
2 Euromoney.
3 Abu Dhabi has another state-owned diversified investment company, Mubadala Development Company,
which recently purchased 7.5% of Carlyle Group. Its links to ADIA and ADIC are unclear. Although its
international investments are listed on its website, transparency about the size of this fund is extremely low.
Oxford Analytica's estimate, based on comparing Mubadala's number of staff (250) with the staff-fund
value ratios at ADIA and the Qatar Investment Authority, is that Mubadala's fund value could be 120 billion
US dollars.
2. Government Pension Fund - Global (Norway)
Launch Year 1990
Fund Value (US dollars) 322 billion (March 2007).4












Receipts from-- oi iicenses, oil taxes. About 80% of the
government's oil-related revenues are transferred into the GPF.
The assets are to be used to meet the country's growing
pensions bill after 2015.
Norwegian Government (Ministry of Finance).
Operational activities are delegated to Norges Bank Investment
Management (NBIM), which is part of the Norwegian Central
Bank. Most of the GPF is managed internally by the Norwegian
central bank, but there are 50 external bond and equity
managers running about 28% of the total.
and - Bonds represent 60% (over half of them AAA-rated) of the
portfolio and equities 40%.
'- Asset allocation broadly reflects the structure of Norway's
imports but with over-emphasis given to the liquid US markets.
- The benchmark is for over 50% to be placed in European
currencies and 35% in North American.
- Asia accounts for less than 10% of asset allocation. The GPF's
investments in emerging markets is growing.
- It has an ethical screening process to exclude companies with
."unacceptable violations of fundamental ethical norms".
NBIM forecasts the fund will reach 500 billion US dollars by
2009.
High. Annual and quarterly reports publicly available.
The fund owns shares in about 3,500 companies, and it holds
small stakes, typically below 1%.
4 Norges Bank http://www.norges-bank.no/Pages/Article 42084.aspx
5 Oxford Analytica calculations from Norges Bank data. http://www.norges-
bank.no/Pages/Article 41397.aspx
3. Government of Singapore Investment
Corporation
Launch Year 1981. A restructuring in 1999 led to the creation of three operating
units: the Public Markets Group, investing in equities, fixed
income, and money market instruments; Government of
Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) Real Estate, investing in
real estate-related assets; and GIC Special Investments, investing
in venture capital and private equity funds, as well as direct
Investments in private companies.
Fund Value (US dollars) 100-330 billion (2007).6
Our analysis says 215 billion.
Fund Value as % of GDP
Growth Rate
169%
GIC's annual return has averaged 9.5% in US dollar terms over
the 25 years to March 2006, since its launch in 1981. In real
terms, the annual rate of retum averaged 5.3%.
Financing L Financed by reserves from high savings rate. -
Objective To preserve and enhance the international purchasing power of
Singapore's reserves, by achieving a real rate of return above the
G3 inflation rate by a specified amount over a specified long-term
horizon. For medium-term performance monitoring, to outperform
an appropriate composite of recognised market indices, through
optimal allocation among and within asset classes.
Z Ownership 7] Private company wholly owned by the Government of Singapore.
Management Lee Kuan Yew, Chairman; Dr Tony Tan, Deputy Chairman &
Executive Director. Lim Siong Guan Group Managing Director (as
of September 22, 2007).
Investment Policy and J Invests in 40 markets, with a long-term focus through systematic
Asset Allocation diversification across equities, fixed income, foreign exchange,
commodities, money markets, alternative investments, real estate
andprivate eq~qity. .
Outlook/Trends Increased holdings in emerging markets are likely.
[-Transparency
Recent Investments
Meim Inoratonabu struicture and linvestments, but no
_j detailed financial reports on website.
July 2007: Part of consortium in 895 million US dollar acquisition
of Myer Melbourne site for redevelopment.
July 2007: Acquisition of a 50% in WestQuay Shopping Centre,
UK, for 600 million US dollars.
June 2007: Purchase of Chapterhouse Holdings Ltd., whose
primary asset is the Merrill Lynch Financial Centre, for 960 million
US dollars.
May 2007: Formation of joint venture with Sumitomo Corporation
to invest 1.3 billion US dollars over two years in Japanese retail
properties.
April 2007: Acquisition of 50% of for Westfield Parramatta
(Australian real estate company) for 584 million US dollars.
6 'Well over 100 billion' (GIC website: http://www.gic.com.sg/aboutus.htm 2007) to 330 billion (Morgan
Stanley, 2007).
4. Kuwait Investment Authority
iLaunch Year
Fund Value (US dollars)













213 billion (March 2007), of which 174 billion invested




Oil. Each year, 10% of state revenues are transferred to
i the Kuwait Investment Authority's (KIA's) Future
Generations Fund (FGF). Assets cannot be withdrawn
from the FGF.
The KIA also manages the Public Reserve Fund, the
[-main treasurer for the government..--, _
To achieve a long term return in order to provide an
alternative to oil reserves for Kuwait's future
generations.
Ministry of Finance
Its board includes the oil minister, a representative of
the central bank and of the finance ministry.
Management of the FGF is outsourced to third-party
managers.
The FGF invests outside Kuwait. Its portfolio includes
1 investments in private equity, hedge funds and real
e s t a t e . . . ....... . .. . .. . .. ..... ... .1
The FGF is shifting from a very conservative strategy,
aimed at preserving capital, towards a more risk-taking
approach, focused on growth.
Low. Disclosure to the public of any information related-
to KIA's workis prohibited bylaw.
The KIA holds significant stakes in Daimler Benz and in
the engineering group GEA.
7 Arab Times (based on a statement by the Minister of Finance)
http: / /www.mafhoum.com/pressl0/304E20.htm.
8 Arab Times http://www.mafhoum.com/pressl0/304E20.htm.
5. China Investment Corporation
Launch Year 2007. Official launch in September, although investment activities
started earlier.
Fund Value (US dollars) 200 billion of foreign exchange reserves is currently being
transferred to China Investment Corporation (CIC). An additional
200 billion may be added if Central Huijin Company, a People's
Bank of China-dominated investment entity that controls three of
China's 'big four' state banks, is folded into CIC as expected. At
current market value, Huijin's shareholdings of the Bank of China,
China Construction Bank and Commercial Bank of China are
worth over 200 billion US dollars.9
Fund Value as % of GDP 8%
Growth Rate The fund's initial capital is still being transferred.
I Financing Transfers from foreign exchange reserves.
Objective To increase the return on assets. Chinese officials have
suggested that the objective will include social and political
returns.
FLOwnership -  -  f-- Chinese government.
Management Deputy Secretary-General of the State Council Lou Jiwei, is likely
to be appointed as the president of the new company. This will
make it a ministerial-level organisation answering directly to the
State Council. The names of the core management team have
yet to be announced. The general manager will possibly come
from the central bank or State Administration of Foreign
Exchange. CIC is likely to delegate a substantial portion of
management to foreign portfolio managers; however, there is
likely to be a long selection process.
Investment Policy- and Intended to manage a-wide array of assets, not j-ust shares from a
Asset Allocation few major financial institutions (as had been the case with Central
Huijin Company).
Outlook/Trends The fund may be required to aim for annual returns above 10%,
in order to cover management costs and probable renminbi
appreciation.
Transparency Low.
Recent Investments CIC in May this year invested three billion US dollars to acquire
almost 10% of the initial public stock offering of US investment
fund Blackstone Group LP. The People's Bank of China bought a
0.46% stake in BG Group plc in June and July this year for 250
million US dollars. This purchase is rumoured to have been on
behalf of the CIC.
9 Oxford Analytica Daily Brief.
6. Stabilization Fund (Russia)
Launch Year
Fund Value (US dollars)











127.5 billion US dollars (March 2007).10
14%
96% (September 2006 to August 2007).
Export duty on oil and petroleum products and taxes on mineral
resources.
The base price of oil is set at 20 US dollars per barrel, above
which revenues start accumulating in the fund. The government
has the right to withdraw money if oil prices fall below the base
level.
Absorb volatility of commodity prices. The fund is currently used
to finance the pension fund and to repay foreign debt.
The government can tap amounts above the base threshold of
500 billion roubles (18 billion US dollars) for expenditures outside
the official budget.
Ministry of Finance.
The fund is managed by the Ministry of Finance. Some asset
management functions are delegated to the central bank.
and Securities must be issued by governments of US and selected EU
countries. Further restrictions on minimum amount and structure
of the issue (eg AAA rated, no options, fixed coupon).Current
currency composition: US dollars - 45 %; euros - 45 %; pounds
sterling - 10 %.
In 2008, the fund will be divided into a reserve fund, which will
continue to be invested conservatively and used when oil and gas
incomes fall; a more aggressive fund, which will invest in higher
risk assets; and federal budgetary spending. The more
aggressive fund may be allocated only 19 billion dollars initially.11
The Ministry of Finance publishes a monthly public report on the
fund's accumulation, spending and balance. Details on
investments are reported quarterly to the Russian Parliament.
The fund has not yet started to invest in global equities.
10 Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation, http://wwwl.minfin.ru/stabfond eng/sobj eng.htm
11 Financial Times, September 18, 2007: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/187ba59a-657f-lldc-bf89-
0000779fd2ac.html
7. Temasek Holdings (Singapore)
LLaunch Year Li974
Fund Value (US dollars) 108 billion (March 2007).12
FFund Value as % of GPID 865%
Growth Rate
Financing
The value of Temasek's portfolio grew 35% over the year
ending on March 31, 2007. Total shareholder return for the
year was 27%.13
1 Reserves from high savings rate and reinvested profits.
Objective Active shareholder and investor. Aims to create and maximise
sustainable value for owner.
[Ownership FA -nexempt-pirivate co m pany' with Minister of Finance as
_JLshareholder. -
Management S Dhanabalan, Chairman. Ho Ching, CEO. Operates as an
autonomous and professional investment house, guided by an
independent board.
Investment Policy and 1 Operates under commercial principles to maximise long-term
Asset Allocation returns. Temasek's geographical asset mix In March 2007
was: Singapore (38%); rest of Asia (excluding Japan) 40%;
I OECD economies (excludin gSouth Korea): 20%;others 2%.
Outlook/Trends Since 2002, Temasek has raised its focus on Asia (except
Singapore and Japan). Over the 12 months to March 2007,
exposure to Singapore declined from 44% to 38% and
exposure to the rest of Asia (excluding Japan) rose from 34%
to 40%. 61% of the portfolio is in the financial services,
telecoms and media sectors.
Transparency High. Audited annual financial reports, as well as periodic
updates, are provided to the Ministry of Finance. While not
required to release financials publicly, group financial
highlights have been published since 2004 in the annual
Temasek Review,
Recent Investments Temasek confirmed on July 23 this year that it is investing
almost 2 billion US dollars In Barclays plc. Temasek will Invest
a further 3 billion US dollars In Barclays conditional upon
completion of the merger with ABN AMRO. Temasek also
holds 17.22% in Standard Chartered Bank 4. Other overseas
Investments during the year to March 2007 included new
holdings In ABC Learning Centres (Australia, Temasek holds
12%), Intercell AG (Austria, 8.1%), Country Garden and Yingli
Green energy (both China), INX Media (India, less than 25%),
Mitsui Life (Japan, 4.6%), PIK Group and VTB Bank (both
Russia). Temasek in May 2007 increased its stake in STATS
ChIpPAC to 83%. In late September 2007 press reports noted
that Temasek and Singapore Airlines together acquired 24% of
China Eastern Airlines Corporation.
12 Temasek Holdings website: http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg/
13 Temasek Holdings website: http://www.temasekholding§.com.sg/
8. Qatar Investment Authority
Launch Year
Fund Value (US dollars)
1, June 2005
Estimated value 50 billion to 70 billion (March 2007).15
Our analysis says 60 billion.












Involved in the investment of Qatar's surplus financial
resources in local and international markets; establishment of
companies and projects; economic and energy affairs.
Q atar government.
Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, son of the Emir of Qatar, is
the Chairman of the authority.
and --
.. Fundsizeexpeted to double by 2010. Qatar InvestmentIAuthority (QIA) plans to expand its Investments In Asia up to
40% of its portfolio (with the rest in the Americas and Europe),
particularly financial institutions and consumer-oriented export
. I Industries.
Low. No reports provided.
.UK care homes provider Four Seasons Healthcare (iO0%).1
Other holdings include 20% (now 24% according to some press
reports in late September) of London Stock Exchange Group,
9.98% in Nordic Exchange OMX (Sweden), 5.1% In Lagardere(France), 97.3% of BLC Bank (Lebanon), 20% In the Housing
Bank for Trade and Finance (Jordan) and 5% in Raffles
Medical Group (Singapore). QIA was a co-Investor In Dubal
International Capital's July 2007 purchase of a 3.12% stake in
European Aeronautic, Defence & Space Co (EADS).
QIA is currently bidding to buy UK retailer Sainsbury, through
Its Delta Two Fund, which already holds 25% of Salnsbury.
14 London Stock Exchange, September 13, 2007.
15 Financial News.
9. Revenue Regulation Fund (Algeria)
Launch Year
Fund Value (US dollars)











44.4 billion (June 2007)1e
49%
9% rise in Algerian dinar terms between October 2006
and June 2007.17
Oil revenue recorded in excess of budget law
projections. The Fund resources may be supplemented
by advances from the Banque d'Algrie.. .
1) Offset the shortfalls resulting from oil tax revenue






I Low. No reports available, no Information on investment
policy. .
Recent Investments
16 El Watan (based on draft budget law for 2008).
http:/ /www.elwatan.com/spip.php?page=article&id article=77485
17 http://www.algerie-dz.com/article6788.html
Is IMF (2005), 'Algeria: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes-Fiscal Transparency Module'
http:/ /www.imf.org/external/pubs/ ft/scr/2005/crO568.pdf
10. Permanent Reserve Fund (Alaska)
Launch Year
Fund Value (US dollars)














17% July 2006 to June 2007; 18% July 2005 to June 2006.
Oil. Each year, the fund's realised earnings are split between
inflation-proofing, operating expenses, and the annual
Permanent Fund Dividend.
Benefit future generations of Alaskans once oil reserves are
depleted. Only investment income can be spent by the State
legislature. Principal cannot be spent without a vote.
Target return: 5% over 10-year period.
State of Alaska.
Managed by the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (APFC).
Part of the portfolio is allocated to several dozen external
managers.
and Target asset allocation: 34% domestic equities, 19%
international equities; 25% domestic fixed income; 4%
International fixed income; 10% real estate; 4% private equity;
4% absolute return.
Historical return over 10 years is 8.4%.
Expected to reach 46 billion US dollars by 2012.
High - public reports.
The fund invests in several dozen sectors and countries. Top
five stockholdings are GE, Exxon, Microsoft, Google and
Procter & Gamble.
19 Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (2006), annual report. htt://www.apfc.org/
11. Libyan Investment Authority
i Launch Year
Fund Value (US dollars)





Financing Initial funds transferred from central bank. The Libyan
Investment Authority will receive an annual portion of
the oil revenue surplus.
Objective Diversify oil revenues into financial assets
-Ownership f Li byan govemnment _ __
Management Libyan Investment Authority. Chairman is Mohamed
Layas.
Investment Policy and] Portfolio investments managed through Westem banksAsset Allocation and institutions.
Outlook/Trends The fund plans to purchase real estate worldwide and,
when it is more established, also engage in private
equity transactions.
Transparency Low/medium. Data on size and investments made
L_ available through the media.
Recent Investments Set-up an investment fund (total 2 billion US dollar) with
the Qatar Investment Authority to invest in Libya, Qatar
and Western markets. Other assets: Lafico (real estate,
3 billion US dollars), Libyan African investment portfolio
(5 billion US dollars), portfolio Investments in capital
markets (8 billion US dollars).
2 Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/c4bd32be-7cd2-lldc-aee2-
0000779fd2ac.htmlnclick check-1
12. Brunei Investment Agency
[ L. a unch Year
Fund Value (US dollars)
L Fund Value as % of-GDP
Growth Rate
1983
30 billion US dollars (March 2007).1
At its peak during the 1990s, it is estimated that
the value of the Brunei Investment Agency (BIA)
was at least 100 billion US dollars. The value of
the fund then declined and seems to have
stabilised at about 30 billion US dollars over the
last several years.
Financing BIA manages the country's foreign exchange
reserves.
I Objective ]l To increase the real value of Brunei's foreign 1
L exchange reserves.
Ownership Part of the Ministry of Finance.
Management Chairman is Pehin Dato Se riSetia Awe Hj
1 Yahya bin Begawan Mudim Dato Paduka Hj
I Baker. Awang Haji All bin Haji Apong was
i appointed Acting Managing Director in May
____ 2003. ____
Investment Guidelines Holdings in the United States, Japan, ASEAN
countries and Western Europe.
Outlook/Trends 7 An ongoing dispute over billions of US dollars, I
which it is claimed were channelled from the BIA
to private bank accounts during the 1990s, now
appears close to being resolved. Former
Chairman of BIA Prince Jefri Bolkiah has been
accused by the Sultan of Brunei (his brother) of
misdlrectng BiA funds. A ruling is expected
before the end of this year. The conclusion of
.. . .... .___ that case will help the SIA to continue to rebuild.
Transparency Very low.
R ntInvestments 8-1A W year-purchased a stake in JordanFIhoshate Mines Company Ltd.
21 Morgan Stanley estimate.
13. Khazanah Nasional (Malaysia)
Launch Year 1993
Fund Value (US dollars) 26.1 billion (May 31, 2007).22
Fund Value as % of GDP 12%
Growth Rate 23% (annual average May 2004-May 2007)23









Part of Khazanah Nasional's (KN's) mandate is to make strategic
investments abroad, under the overarching objective of 'nation
building' for Malaysia. Other key themes of the strategic
investment mandate include: Creating sustainable value; raising
national competitiveness; and cultivating a culture of high
performance.
Through its investments in Malaysian legacy companies, KN
seeks to achieve these aims by promoting restructuring and
reorganisation.
Ministry of Finance. KN is the investment-holding arm of the
--government of Malaysia._ ..
The Prime Minister of Malaysia is the Chairman of the Board. The
Management team is headed by Managing Director Dato' Azman
b. Hj Mokhtar.
and KN has investments in over 50 companies, in Malaysia and
i abroad, within over a dozen different sectors. The major sectors
are utilities (23.5% of portfolio in May 2007), media and
communications (22.3%), and infrastructure and construction
LO8.2%).
KN is a leader in innovative Islamic finance. It issued the world's
first exchangeable Sukuk (Sharia-compliant bond) in October
2006, for 750 million US dollars.
The proportion of KN's total portfolio held in foreign investments
has risen from 0.2% in May 2004 to 9.2% in May 2007.
Over the next three years, KN aims to increase synergies across
its investments and to continue to broaden the base of its
investments.
N High. Annual report provides good data.
KN has investments in 12 Asian countries, Saudi Arabia, the
UAE, New Zealand and the UK (Proton, the Malaysian national
carmaker). The main destinations of KN's investment abroad are
Indonesia (4.3% of total portfolio), India (1.8%), China (1.6%) and
Singapore (1.4%).
22 Khazanah Nasional annual review of June 1, 2007 (using exchange rate of May 31, 2007. Net worth, using
the same exchange rate, is 18.3 billion US dollars):
http://www.khazanah.com.my/docs/2007%220Annual%20Review%201une%20007.pdf
23 Growth between May 2004 to May 2007 was 87%. Khazanah Nasional annual report:
http://www.khazanah.com.my/docs/2007%2OAnnual%20Review%201une%202007.pdf















capital of 20 billion dollars (2007).24
capital is still being invested.
Of the Korea Investment Corporation's (KIC's) initial capital, 17
billion US dollars was transferred from the Bank of Korea's
foreign exchange reserves, and 3 billion dollars from the Ministry
of Economy and Finance's Foreign Exchange Stabilization
Fund.25
To achieve a stable and continuous return exceeding the
benchmark within an appropriate level of risk, and to foster
development of local financial industry and of local talent pool.
26
Government of Korea.
The KIC is designed to be run commercially and independently.
It has engaged external fund managers but has not provided
further details. The Korean government expects KIC's external
fund managers to transfer global best practices to local Korean
managers over time.
Serck-Joo Hong was appointed president and CEO in
September 2006.
and KIC's asset classes may include securities (including stocks and
bonds defined under the KIC Act), foreign currencies and
derivatives.
It is the government's intention to invest the full initial 20 billion
US dollars by the beginning of next year, and to begin covering
its costs by 2010. A further 90 billion US dollars of existing
official reserves could soon be transferred to the KIC.
Medium. KIC plans to disclose its financial statements and
accounting standards; audit report for financial statements; mid-
and long-term investment policies; total value of assets under
management and rate of return; composition ratio and rate of
return for each asset class. The Steering Committee exercises
supervision over KIC's business, and may, as prescribed under
the KIC Act, entrust a private accounting firm to inspect the
business.





15. National Development Fund (Venezuela)
{ Luch Yer ]i2005
Fund Value (US dollars) 17.5 billion (end 2006).27
Fund Value as % of GDP 11% ]
Growth Rate The value of the fund increased from zero to 17.5 billion US
dollars in just over two years.
Financing ]7Transfers from the international reserves of the Central Bank
-of Venezuela and from the national oil company Petroleos de
..Obj .... . .. .. Venezuela SA (PDVSA). _
Objective The National Development Fund's (Fonden's) official role is to
manage and disburse funds for purchasing foreign debt, goods
and services in foreign currency, and to maintain a reserve in
case of disasters.
Ownership .Goverment of Venezuela]
Management --
Investment Policy and L Fanden's portfolio is unclear,
Asset Allocation 
_ _L
Outlook The Fonden appears to have become a major vehicle for
funding domestic investments in infrastructure and social
projects. This is likely to continue and so will limit the
proportion of the fund that is available for investment abroad.
In the event of a decline in the oil price, there is a risk that the
size of the fund may decline rapidly as it is used to fund current
domestic public expenditure.
Transpar-ency Very low. There is no auditing, acoountability or parliamentary
oversight of the funds, a significant proportion of which are
I believed to be held outside Venezuela.
Recent Investments
27 Unofficial quote by senior member of Central Bank of Venezuela.
16. Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund (Canada)
Launch Year L1976 -..... ... .
Fund Value (US dollars) 16.4 billion 28
Fund Value as % of GDP 1.1%
Growth Rate 22% (January to December 2006).
LFinancing il__
Objective To manage savings from Alberta's non-renewable resources.
The investment Income earned by the Heritage Fund is
transferred to the province's budget.
Ownership 7] Ministry of Finance. -
Management Investment Management Division, within the Ministry of Finance.
Investment Policy and Target Investment allocation: 29% fixed Income; 15% US equity; 
Asset Allocation 115% non- North American equities; 15% Canadian equities; 10%[ et 
_j _real esateL4%prvate equty 12 other .
Outlook/Trends Forecasted to reach 16.5 billion US dollars in 2009/10.
Transparency 7I HIgh. Quarterly and annual reports and business plans are
_______ _J l va.lable. _ j
2s Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund: http://www.finance.gov.ab.ca/business/ahstf/index.html
17. National Stabilization Fund (Taiwan)
LLaunch Year
Fund Value (US dollars)











15.2 billion (August 2007).
29
The value of the National Stabilization Fund (NSF) appears to
have declined slightly from 16.1 billion US dollars at its launch.3 °
The sources of the NSF are a 6.3 billion US dollar collateral-
backed loan from local financial institutions and 9.46 billion US
dollars in cash from postal savings, postal insurance savings, and
pension funds for public sector workers.
'Crisis management' for Taiwan's capital markets, which tend to be
dominated by individual investors. The fund's draft regulations
stipulate that it can be used on three conditions: 1) When share
prices on the stock market fall significantly over an extended
period of time. 2) When massive movements of international
capital occur or when foreign speculators attempt to manipulate
fluctuations in local financial markets. 3) When major domestic or
overseas events threaten market order or national security.
However, the draft regulations state that the fund will not be used
to intervene in the foreign exchange market.
. 7i~inistry of Finance -
A committee chaired by the finance minister is responsible for the
fund's management. It consists of seven to nine members,
including the governor of the central bank; the minister of
transportation and communications; the director-general of the
budget, accounting and statistics; the chairman of the Council of
Labour Affairs; the director-general of the Central Personnel
Administration; and up to three scholars invited by the Ministry of
Finance.
and --
The NSF has come under considerable media pressure to
intervene in order to support Taiwan's stock market during periods
of turbulence this year. It is unclear whether/how much the NSF
may have intervened so far.
IVery low. Managers and others associated with the NSF are
subject to imprisonment and fines if found guilty of leaking
information about the committee's investment plans.31
Recent Investments
29 Taipei Times archive: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2007/08/18/2003374790
30 Taiwan Journal: http://taiwanioumal.nat.gov.tw/ct.as?xtem=17763&CtNode=122
31 Taiwan Journal: http://taiwaniournal.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xltem=17763&CtNode=122
18. National Fund (Kazakhstan)
Launch Year
Fund Value (US dollars)












14.9 billion US dollars (August 2007).32
]F16%
The value of the National fund (NFl increased by 36%
between August 2006 and August 2007.3
The NF was integrated into the budgetary system in July
2006: receipts from all extractive companies are now
channelled to the NF.
Dual function of saving for future generations and stabilising
government budget. The NF is also drawn upon to fund public
investment.
Government of Kazakhstan
ABN AMRO Mellon Global Securities Services provides
custody and income collection; portfolio accounting, including
daily valuation; monthly reconciliation; performance
measurement; compliance monitoring; and securities lending.
Investment management is allocated via a bidding process.
External managers for global fixed income are ABN AMRO
Asset Management; BNP Paribas Asset Management/FFTW;
Deutsche Asset Management; State Street Global Advisors;
and Union Bank Priv~e. External Managers for global indexed
equities are Credit Suisse Asset Management and HSBC
Asset Management.
'The NF has two portfolios: a stabilisation portfolio (minimum
20% of the NF) -- to ensure lower volatility of returns; and a
savings portfolio -- to ensure higher long-term returns.
Benchmarks: Stabilisation portfolio: Merrill Lynch 6-month US
Treasury Bill Index. Savings portfolio: 75% Salomon World
Government Bonds Index 80% US dollar hedged (SWGB
Index 80% hedged); 25% Morgan Stanley Capital International
(MSCI) World excluding Energy sector. Investment categories:
Government Bonds included in SWGB; corporate bonds with
A- credit rating or higher; mortgage backed securities and
asset backed securities with credit rating above AA-; stocks
included in MSCI World Index; derivatives for tactical asset
allocation and hedging.
Medium. The NF website provides up-to-date data on
revenues and expenditure. However, specific explanations of
how the NF's resources are being used are lacking.
The NF is fully invested in foreign markets.
32 National Fund website: http://www.nationalfund.kz
33 Asian Development Bank/National Bank of Kazakhstan:
http: / /www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2007/KAZ.asp
19. Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (Chile)
Launch Year March 2007. The Economic and Social Stabilization Fund
(ESSF) absorbed the Copper Stabilization Fund, which was
launched in 1985.
Fund Value (US dollars) 11.2 billion, including funds of Copper Stabilization Fund
(September 30, 2007). 34
Fu-ndValue as % of GDP 8.7%
Growth Rate Annualised internal rate of return of 2.6% .
I-Financing 'Copper-related revenues. Revenues in excess of the 1%
structural surplus will be paid into the ESSF, which is
designed to finance any fiscal deficits that may occur in
periods of economic downturn.
Objective To smooth government expenditure in social areas (eg
education, housing and health).
Ownership Govemment of Chile
Management Managed by the Central Bank. Custodial services provided by
JP Morgan Worldwide Securities Services.
Investment Policy and I The fund can invest domestically and abroad. As of
Asset Allocation September 2007, the portfolio allocation was as follows:
67.5% sovereign; 2.2% agency; 30.3% bank. Quarterly and
monthly reports provide further detail on the currency
breakdown (between US dollars, euros and yen) and the
J terms of the investments.
Outlook/Trends Currently formulating investment strategy to include new asset
classes.
* Transparency High. Monthly and quarterly reports are available on the
Ministry of Finance website.
Recent Investments See above for current portfolio allocation.
34 Ministry of Finance of Chile: http://www.hacienda.cl




Fund Value (US dollars) No reported value. Estimated value 8 billion.36
Fund Value as % of GDP 7%
Growth Rate --
Financing Oil
Objective Focus on financial returns, but also support Dubai's status as
an international commercial hub.
i-Ownership Part of holding company Dubai World, founded by Sheikh
Mohammed, Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai.
Management Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem, Chairman of Dubai World, is also
Istithmar's Chairman. CEO is David Jackson, former
investment banker at Lehman Brothers.
I Investment Policy and Focus on consumer, financial, real estate and industrial
Asset Allocation sectors.
Detailed asset allocation not available. Appears to invest
mainly in equities and real estate.
Outlook/Trends Expected to invest 3-4 billion US dollars annually.
Transparency Low - no reports provided. List of investments available.
Recent investments 1.2 billion US dollars in Standard Chartered Bank.
3% stake in hedge fund GLG.
Agreement to buy fashion chain Barneys in August 2007 for
942 million US dollars.
In September 2007 Istithmar joined MGM Mirage's joint
venture with Kerzner International to build a multi-billion dollar
resort in Las Vegas, according to press reports.
36 Euromoney, Financial News.
21. Dubai International Capital (UAE)
Launch Year 2004
Fund Value (US dollars) No reported value. Estimated value 6 billion.37












The purpose of DIC is to create a return for its shareholder,
Dubai Holding and its ultimate shareholders, the Ruling Family
of the Emirate of Dubai.
Part of Dubai Holding, which also includes a number of large-
scale infrastructure and investment projects in Dubai. It is not,
as commonly thought, an investment arm of the Government of
Dubai.
Sameer Al Ansari, Executive Chairman and CEO, former
Group Chief Financial Officer for The Executive Office of
Sheikh Mohammed.
and Focus on private equity investments. Operates through three
divisions: global buyouts, Middle East/North Africa investments,
and public equities (leveraged stakes in large public
companies).
Expected to invest 3-4 billion dollars annually.
Low. No public reports available, but list of selected
investments.
800 million pound sterling acquisition of Tussauds Group.
700 million pound sterling acquisition of Doncasters.
675 million pound sterling secondary buyout of Travelodge.
One billion US dollar investment in DaimlerChrysler.
DIC purchased 'substantial stakes' in HSBC Holdings (May
2007) and in Indian bank ICICI Bank Ltd. (July 2007). It has
also invested in EADS (July 2007).
37 Euromoney, Financial News.
22. State General Reserve Fund (Oman)
Launch Year
Fund Value












Not disclosed. Estimates range form 2-10 billion US dollars. 38





Wave Seafront Resort in Oman. Reported to be involved in the
development of Heron Tower in London.
38 Euromoney, Morgan Stanley.
Appendix
i. The Future Fund (Australia)
Launch Year
Fund Value (US dollars)




42 billion (May 2007).39
6%
The fund has a target return of 4.5-5.5% above Consumer Price
Index inflation (CPI) over the long term. The Board has
interpreted this as an objective to provide a return of at least 5%
above CPI over rolling 10-year periods.
Government surpluses. The fund's value also includes the value
of approximately 2.1 billion shares in Telstra Corporation, most of
which are held under escrow until mid-2008.
Objective Established to fully fund the future superannuation payments of
public servants, which currently come from the federal budget.
The fund aims to fully underwrite the unfunded superannuation
liability by 2020.
Ow.ne ..rsh.p _.Government of Australia.
Management In May 2007 a competitive tender to manage the Future Fund
was won by US fund management company Northern Trust
Corporation.
The fund is overseen by an independent Board of Guardians,
selected on the basis of expertise in investment management
and corporate governance. The Chairman of the Board of
Guardians and CEO of the Future Fund Management Agency is
David Murray. Paul Costello is the General Manager of the
Future Fund Management Agency.
Ilnvestment Policy and Invest in a broad, diversified range of assets. The Future Fund
Asset Allocation does not intend to publish details of its investment programme.
Outlook/Trends The size of the Future Fund in 2020 may be about 103 billion US
dollars 40 .
Transparency Medium. The first annual report is due to be published in
September.
Recent Investments The initial cash contributions to the Fund -- about 33 billion US
dollars, have been invested with the Reserve Bank of Australia
before being transitioned into a broad range of asset classes.
This strategic asset allocation process has started and is likely to
take several years to complete. Most of the Telstra shares
cannot be traded until November 2008.
3 9http://www.futurefund.gov.au/
4
o Parliament of Australia, Research Note no. 43 2004-05
ii. Government Pension Fund (Thailand)
Launch Year
Fund Value (US dollars)













The net rate of return to members was 3.44% in 2006 and
6.83% in 2005.42
No less than 20% of annual budget, plus monthly member and
employer (government) contributions.
Management of retirement savings.
Government of Thailand
The GPF is supervised and managed by the Government
Pension Fund Board. It uses seven fund managers to manage
about one-fifth of its portfolio.
and Emphasises the safety of the principal fund, coupled with good
returns that outperform long-term inflation. As of June 2007,
the GPF's asset allocation was: Thai fixed income 67.77%;
Thai equity 11.57%; global equity 12.64%; Alternative
investment 4.02%; Property 4.00%.
The GPF has stated this month that it is positioning itself as a
global fund manager.43 Next year it plans to explore investing
in global bonds rather than just local bonds.
Medium-high. Quarterly financial statements available on
website, but little detail about specific investments.-
41 GPF website: http://www.gpf.or.th/GeneralServlet
42 GPF website: htt://www. f or.th/GeneralServlet
43http:/ /www.thailandoutlook.com/thailandoutlookl/top%20menu/investor%20news/Daiy%2News%2
OSummary?DATEDAILY=Friday,%2OAugust%2010,%202007
iii. Pension Guarantee Fund (Chile)
Launch Year December 2006
Fund Value (US dollars) 1.42 billion (September 30, 2007).44
Fund Value as % of GDP 1.1%
Growth Rate Annualised internal rate of return of 2.47%." 5
Financing Funded through part of the annual structural surplus.
Objective Designed to guard against the fiscal impact of an ageing
population. Cannot be drawn upon until 2016.







Managed by the Central Bank. Custodial services provided by
JP Morgan Worldwide Securities Services.
and The fund can invest domestically and abroad. As of September
2007, the portfolio allocation was as follows: 66.2% sovereign;
2.5% agency; 31.3% bank. Quarterly and monthly reports
provide further detail on the currency breakdown (between US
dollars, euros and yen) and the terms of the investments.
Currently formulating investment strategy to include new asset
classes.
High. Monthly and quarterly reports are available on the
Ministry of Finance website.
See above for current portfolio allocation.
44 Ministry of Finance of Chile: http://www.hacienda.cl
45 Ministry of Finance of Chile: http://www.hacienda.cl
iv. Botswana Pula Fund
Launch Year
Fund Value (US dollars)














v. State Oil Fund (Azerbaijan)
Launch Year
Fund Value (US dollars)















5% (December 2005 to February 2007)
Oil
Assets are used to finance the state budget, new
infrastructure projects and social projects.
Government of Azerbaijan.
The executive director (Shahmar Movsumov) is appointed
directly by the president of Kazakhstan. The Supervisory
Board includes several members of the Cabinet. About 8% of
the fund's assets are administered by external managers.
1 About 60% of the fund is invested in cash, the remainder
i mostly in bonds. Only a marginal portion (0.3%) is Invested in
Lequites..
I High. Annual reports publicly available. .... . i
47 State Oil Fund http://www.oilfund.az/
vi. Heritage and Stabilization Fund (Trinidad &
Tobago)
Launch Year L2006
Fund Value (US dollars) 1.4 billion (2006).48











500 million US dollars were transferred to the HSF in 2006. 49
60% of excess revenues will be allocated to the Heritage and
.
-Sta b iliza tio n F u n d (H S F ). 6 
-
To insulate fiscal policy and the economy from swings in
international oil and gas prices and to accumulate savings
from the country's oil and gas assets for future generations.
The main aim is to be able to maintain public expenditure over
the long term when oil and gas revenues decline.
Government of Trinidad & Tobago
The Central Bank is responsible for the day-to-day
management of the HSF, in order to meet investment
objectives set by the Board. However, most of this
management is being outsourced to external fund managers.
The Board is appointed by the President of Trinidad &
Tobago, following advice from the Ministry of Finance.
and The HSF invests in foreign assets. It has a long-term focus on
maximising expected returns within a set of risk constraints.
The Board determines the level of risk tolerance (within a
range of medium to high) of the HSF and the target portfolio
return.
Transfers out of the fund for the purpose of economic
stabilisation will be resisted if the value of the HSF declines to
one billion US dollars.
* Legislation stipulates quarterly reports by the Central Bank to
I the Board, and annual reports by the Minister of Finance to
parliament. Some or all of these will be madepublic.
4
s Ministry of Finance:
http://www.finance.gov.tt/documentlibrary/downoads/10/Enill%20Media%2OBriefing%2on%2Othe%2
OEconomy%2Ocurrent%201.df




0 Bank for International Settlements: http://www.bis.org/review/rO7O522d.pdf
vii. Fund for Macroeconomic Stabilisation
(Venezuela)
Launch Year 2003 (previously the FIEM -- Investment Fund for
Macroeconomic Stabilisation). Legislation governing the Fund
for Macroeconomic Stabilisation (FEM) was revised in 2005.
Fund Value (US dollars) 793 million (March 2007).51
Fund Value as % of GDP 0.5 %
Growth Rate 13% growth over the last four years. 3.3% annual growth to
August 2007.2
Financing Transfers of state funds resulting from fiscal surpluses,
privatisations and other ad hoc transfers.
Objective To provide for stability of public expenditure at national, state
and municipal levels.
Ownership Ministry of Finance.
Management The Treasury Bank (a state institution). The president of the
FEM and its four board members are nominated by the
president of Venezuela.
Investment Policy and", -
Asset AllocationA s .- - .1c io. ..... .I. .............. - , ....... . .......... . . . . . .... ...... . ............. . . . . .......... . . . .... ..
Outlook/Trends The relative importance of the FEM has decreased sharply
over the last two to three years as the government has
established alternative off-budget funds such as Fonden (see
above), which have far larger resources. There is no sign of
this trend changing.
Transparency Basic data on the fund is available on the website of the
Central Bank of Venezuela. However, there is no transparency
about where the fund is being invested.
51 Central Bank of Venezuela
s2 Central Bank of Venezuela
viii. Revenue Equalization Fund (Kiribati)
Launch Year 1956
Fund Value 400 million dollars
5 3
F Fund Value as % of GDP 526%
Growth Rate
Financing Phosphates
Objective Possible financing for domestic enterprises.
Ownership
Management Possible financing for domestic enterprises.
Investment Policy and Prudent management. Was entirely invested in offshore funds
Asset Allocation in 2001. Designed to maintain real per capita value over time.
Outlook/Trends Financing of budget shortfalls means slower fund growth.
[Transparency
Recent Investments --
5 3 Morgan Stanley.
ix) Foreign Exchange Reserve Fund (Iran)
Launch Year
Fund Value (Us dollars)











Press reports from earlier this year suggest that as of
January 2007, the Foreign Exchange Reserve Fund (FERF)
was empty or even overdrawn.-
Zero
The Iranian Central Bank suggested in January 2006 that
the value of the FERF would rise to 14-15 billion US dollars
by March 2006. 55 Since then, the resources of the FERF
appear to have been used up by the government.
___'Revenues related to hydrocarbons exports.
Provide support to domestic industry and cover fiscal
deficits.
-_ [Govern-me-n of Iran.
Government of Iran.
The FERF appears no longer to be relevant. However,
there is a chance that it may be replenished from future
privatisation revenues or further hydrocarbons windfalls.
-- 'Very low.
In 2004 the FERF committed to disbursing over 8.5 billion




Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law's
Law Institute of the Americas
(formerly SMU Centre for NAFTA and Latin American Legal Studies)*
Established in 1952, the LAW INSTITUTE OF THE AMERICAS at Southern
Methodist University Dedman School of Law was originally designed to promote
good will and to improve relations among the peoples of the Americas through
the study of comparative laws, institutions and governments respecting the
American Republics, and to train lawyers in handling legal matters pertaining to
the nations of the Western Hemisphere. Today, in reviving this institution, the
Law Institute of the Americas comprises meaningful academic research, teaching
and programs pertaining to the "NAFTA/FTAA processes" and other Western
Hemispheric integration efforts; to Latin and Central American law and judicial
reform, particularly focusing on Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico,
Peru and Venezuela; and, to a more limited extent, to Canadian legal issues,
particularly as they interrelate to the NAFTA/FTAA. The Law Institute of the
Americas also is concerned with increasing (regional and hemispheric) legal and
economic interconnections between the "NAFTA/FTAA processes" and
European and Asia-Pacific integration activities.
The officers of the Institute are as follows: the HONORABLE ROBERTO
MACLEAN, President; PROFESSOR JOSEPH J. NORTON, Executive Director; and
PROFESSOR GEORGE A. MARTINEZ, Associate Executive Director. The Institute
is also supported by a distinguished group of Professorial Fellows, Senior
Research Scholars, Professional Fellows, and Student Research Fellows.
As the Institute focuses primarily on issues pertaining to the North American
Free Trade Agreement and the pending Free Trade Area of the Americas, and
the broader economic, political, legal, and social integration processes underway
in the Western Hemisphere, Law and Business Review of the Americas is one of
its publications, and is produced jointly by the Law Institute of the Americas and
the International Law Review Association of SMU. Other parties involved in the
production of the journal are the SMU Cox School of Business, the SMU
Departments of Economics and Political Science, the London Forum, and the
American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice.
* From 1952 through the early 1970s, the name was the Law Institute of the
Americas; in 1993, it was reactivated as the Centre for NAFTA and Latin Amer-
ican Legal Studies; and in 1998, it returned to its original name. For further
detailed historical information on the Law Institute of the Americas, please re-
fer to the Law Institute of the Americas' website at http://www.law.smu.edu/lia.
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